If there's one thing investors think they can be sure of, it's that China will always be our rock. Europe and the US economy may be head cases half the time, but China's never going to let us down.

　　如果投資者覺(jué)得自己對(duì)什么東西很有把握，那就是中國(guó)將始終是我們的希望。歐美經(jīng)濟(jì)或許是經(jīng)常抽風(fēng)，但中國(guó)永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)讓我們失望。

　　That's why, if China tightens policy here and there, as it did yet again this weekend, it's simply engineering a soft landing for its still-muscular economy, keeping inflation at bay, and all that. Nothing to see here, nothing to worry about.

　　Getty所以，如果中國(guó)像這個(gè)周末再一次所做的那樣，隨處收緊政策，那也只是在讓其仍舊強(qiáng)健有力的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)軟著陸、把通貨膨脹控制住，除此以外別無(wú)其他。該干嘛干嘛去吧，沒(méi)有什么好擔(dān)心的。

　　Maybe we should pay closer attention, warns Michael Darda of MKM Partners:

　　交易與研究公司MKM Partners的達(dá)爾達(dá)(Michael Darda)說(shuō)，或許我們應(yīng)該觀察得更仔細(xì)一些。

　　China looks like an accident waiting to happen, in our view. Chinese policymakers have decided to broaden the base of financial institutions required to comply with 21.5% reserve requirements, which will effectuate a further tightening of liquidity. A collapsing term structure of interest rates and a sharp slowing in both narrow and broad liquidity suggest this tightening process is well underway.

　　在我們看來(lái)，中國(guó)就像是一場(chǎng)等著發(fā)生的事故。中國(guó)的政策制定者已經(jīng)決定要求更多金融機(jī)構(gòu)遵守21.5%的存款準(zhǔn)備金率，這將造成流動(dòng)性進(jìn)一步收緊。利率期限結(jié)構(gòu)的崩潰，狹義和廣義流動(dòng)性的急劇放緩，說(shuō)明這一收緊過(guò)程早已開(kāi)始。

　　We would also point out that China’s EMBI debt spreads widened to 218 bps last week from a 2010 low of 26 bps. Although many believe China’s policymakers will simply “flip the switch back on” like they did with a massive monetized fiscal binge in 2009, we would suggest they cannot do so without creating further imbalances that will have to be unwound down the road.

　　我們還要指出，中國(guó)債券相對(duì)于新興市場(chǎng)債券指數(shù)(EMBI)的息差已從2010年低點(diǎn)26個(gè)基點(diǎn)擴(kuò)大至上周的218個(gè)基點(diǎn)。雖然很多人相信中國(guó)的政策制定者會(huì)像2009年實(shí)施大規(guī)模貨幣化財(cái)政刺激一樣輕松地“重新打開(kāi)電閘”，我們還是認(rèn)為，如果這樣做，他們不可能不造成進(jìn)一步失衡。

　　The Federal Reserve was only able to manage one soft landing (1995) in nearly six decades of post-war monetary policymaking. Yet, somehow, many believe Chinese policymakers with much cruder tools and a far less sophisticated financial system will be able to unwind a decade-long liquidity and credit boom seamlessly. We wouldn’t count on it.

　　美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在戰(zhàn)后接近60年的貨幣政策制定中，只在1995年成功地實(shí)現(xiàn)了一次軟著陸。但不知什么緣故，很多人相信中國(guó)的政策制定者將能夠不出絲毫差錯(cuò)地糾正一場(chǎng)為期10年的流動(dòng)性與信貸膨脹，何況他們的政策工具粗糙生硬得多，其金融系統(tǒng)也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不及美國(guó)的成熟。我們不會(huì)指望它。