Who has survived the global credit crisis in the best shape? As Zhou Enlai is reputed to have said about the impact of the French Revolution, it is still too early to judge. The snap verdict that China is the big winner and the US and rest of the old Group of Seven big losers is already looking questionable.

　　哪個(gè)國(guó)家以最佳狀態(tài)渡過(guò)了此次全球信貸危機(jī)？正如據(jù)說(shuō)周恩來(lái)在談到法國(guó)大革命的影響時(shí)所說(shuō)的那句話一樣：現(xiàn)在做出判斷還為時(shí)過(guò)早。那種認(rèn)為中國(guó)是大贏家、而美國(guó)和七國(guó)集團(tuán)(G7)其它國(guó)家是大輸家的倉(cāng)促結(jié)論，目前看上去已令人生疑。

　　True, China has continued to register turbo-charged growth while many of the debt-laden economies of the west have struggled. No surprise, then, that a tsunami of financial capital has surged eastwards, or that European politicians are scrabbling for trade deals, despite China’s extraordinarily aggressive posture over the Nobel peace prize and other diplomatic issues.

　　不錯(cuò)，中國(guó)持續(xù)實(shí)現(xiàn)了高速增長(zhǎng)，而許多負(fù)債累累的西方經(jīng)濟(jì)體一直步履維艱。因此，并不令人感到意外的是，一場(chǎng)金融資本“海嘯”已向東方?jīng)坝勘剂?，同時(shí)盡管中國(guó)在諾貝爾和平獎(jiǎng)及其它外交問(wèn)題上態(tài)度格外強(qiáng)硬，歐洲政客們?nèi)栽跔?zhēng)搶著（與中國(guó)的）貿(mào)易交易。

　　The financial markets, however, have taken a rather different view. The Shanghai market is at less than half its all-time high, significantly underperforming the other three members of the Bric group. More surprising, since the start of the US subprime crisis in August 2007, Shanghai’s total return in dollars has been beaten by the American S&P500, the UK’s FTSE?100, and even the Japanese Topix.

　　然而，金融市場(chǎng)的狀況則大不相同。目前上海股市的點(diǎn)位尚不及歷史高點(diǎn)的一半，表現(xiàn)遠(yuǎn)遜于金磚四國(guó)(Bric)的其它三個(gè)成員。更讓人感到意外的是，自從2007年8月美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來(lái)，以美元計(jì)算，上海股市的總體回報(bào)率還不如美國(guó)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)、英國(guó)富時(shí)100指數(shù)(FTSE?100)，甚至是日本的東證指數(shù)(Topix)。

　　The message is clear. The China story that has been sold so skilfully all over the world is simply another version of the “new era” thinking that has characterised every investment mania from the South Sea bubble to the dotcom frenzy.

　　其中傳遞出的訊息相當(dāng)明確：在全球范圍內(nèi)被熟練兜售的“中國(guó)故事”，只不過(guò)是“新時(shí)代”思維的另一個(gè)版本——從南海泡沫(South Sea bubble)到網(wǎng)絡(luò)熱潮，所有投資癲狂都以這種思維為特征。

　　After the extended period of disappointing performance, Chinese shares no longer look so expensive in terms of the current price to earnings ratio. But this may be deceptive. On the cyclically adjusted “Shiller PE” – which uses a 10-year average of earnings – the China market is even now almost as expensive as the US stock market was in 1929. In other words, the current level of Chinese earnings is high and probably unsustainable.

　　經(jīng)過(guò)了長(zhǎng)時(shí)間令人失望的低迷之后，以目前的市盈率水平來(lái)看，中國(guó)股票看上去不再那么昂貴。但這或許帶有欺騙性。以經(jīng)過(guò)周期性調(diào)整的“席勒市盈率”(Shiller PE，使用了10年平均收益)衡量，即便是現(xiàn)在，中國(guó)股市也幾乎與1929年的美國(guó)股市一樣昂貴。換言之，目前中國(guó)的收益水平很高，可能無(wú)法持續(xù)。

　　There are good grounds for concern about the future. A significant increase in the profit share of national income, as we have seen in China this century, implies a significant decrease in the labour share – meaning that wages fail to keep up with economic growth. The other side of this is apparent in the gross domestic product numbers – a decline in the contribution of consumption and a ballooning dependence on investment. The longer these trends continue, the greater the ultimate reversal.

　　我們有充足的理由對(duì)未來(lái)感到擔(dān)憂。正如我們?cè)诒臼兰o(jì)的中國(guó)所看到的那樣，利潤(rùn)在國(guó)民收入中所占的比例大幅上升，表明勞動(dòng)力收入所占比例大幅下滑，這意味著薪資漲幅未能跟上經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)速度。國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)數(shù)據(jù)則明顯體現(xiàn)出了另一面：消費(fèi)的貢獻(xiàn)率下滑，而對(duì)投資的依賴明顯增強(qiáng)。這些趨勢(shì)持續(xù)的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng)，最終逆轉(zhuǎn)的規(guī)模也就越大。

　　We’ve seen this movie before – 40 years ago, to be exact. In the 1960s Japan was achieving year upon year of double-digit GDP growth, fuelled by government-directed investment into infrastructure projects such as the bullet-train network and the build-up of heavy industry. Throughout this period, workers were flooding into the cities from the countryside, depressing wages and setting off a virtuous cycle of rising profitability and rising investment.

　　我們此前曾目睹過(guò)這一幕——確切地說(shuō)，是在40年前。上世紀(jì)60年代，日本實(shí)現(xiàn)了兩位數(shù)的年度GDP增速，推動(dòng)因素是政府指導(dǎo)投資流向子彈頭列車網(wǎng)絡(luò)等基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目，并加強(qiáng)重工業(yè)發(fā)展。在整個(gè)60年代，勞動(dòng)力不斷從鄉(xiāng)村涌入城市，這壓低了薪資水平，并形成了一個(gè)盈利能力和投資水平不斷上升的良性循環(huán)。

　　In the mid-1950s, Japanese labour had taken 60 percent of total value added. In the miracle years this ratio fell to 50 percent, then started a V-shaped recovery in 1970 as the labour market tightened. Ten years later it had soared to a plateau of 68 per cent. These gains had to be fought for. In the 1970s, Japan’s now dormant union movement was in its heyday. Profit margins were squeezed, and in real terms the stock market went nowhere for a decade.

　　上世紀(jì)50年代中期，日本勞動(dòng)力收入占總增加值的60%。在“日本奇跡”的那些年，這一比率降至50%，然后在70年代、隨著勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的收緊，開(kāi)始了V型復(fù)蘇。10年后，該比率飆升并穩(wěn)定在了68%。這些成績(jī)是要靠奮力爭(zhēng)取的。如今處于休眠期的日本工會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)，上世紀(jì)70年代時(shí)正如火如荼。當(dāng)時(shí)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)率受到擠壓，以實(shí)際價(jià)值計(jì)算，日本股市10年間裹足不前。

　　Can workers grab a bigger share of the economic pie before the urbanisation process is complete? In Japan they did. In 1970 Japan’s urbanisation ratio (the proportion of urban population to total population) was still just 53 percent. Currently the Chinese urbanisation ratio is 45 percent, roughly where Japan was in 1964. However, Chinese statistics are notoriously unreliable. The floating population of unregistered urban migrants is estimated at between 50m and 140m people. So China’s true urbanisation ratio may already be close to Japan’s in 1970.

　　在城市化進(jìn)程完成之前，員工們能夠在這張經(jīng)濟(jì)大餅中分得更大的一塊嗎？在日本，他們做到了。1970年，日本的城市化率（城市人口占總?cè)丝诘谋嚷剩﹥H為53%。而目前，中國(guó)的城市化率為45%，大致相當(dāng)于日本1964年的水平。不過(guò)，眾所周知，中國(guó)的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)不太可靠。據(jù)估計(jì)，未注冊(cè)城市移民組成的流動(dòng)人口在5000萬(wàn)至1.4億之間。因此，中國(guó)的實(shí)際城市化率可能已接近日本1970年的水平。

　　If China were to follow Japan, the next stage would be labour strife and inflation. The best way to avoid that outcome would be a radical tightening of the current super-easy monetary policy. But that would risk a serious slowdown and probably necessitate a large revaluation of the renminbi – both anathema to Beijing. Meanwhile, China’s reliance on a cheap currency is helping to fuel a trade war, in the words of the Brazilian finance minister.

　　如果中國(guó)將重演日本的歷史，那么下一階段將出現(xiàn)勞資沖突和通脹。避免這種后果的最佳途徑，是大幅收緊目前超級(jí)寬松的貨幣政策。但這可能會(huì)造成經(jīng)濟(jì)明顯放緩，人民幣可能必須大幅升值——這兩點(diǎn)都是中國(guó)政府最不希望看到的。同時(shí)，用巴西財(cái)長(zhǎng)的話來(lái)說(shuō)，中國(guó)對(duì)廉價(jià)貨幣的依賴，在引發(fā)一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)方面正起到推波助瀾的作用。

　　There is no good way out of the corner into which China has painted itself. Rebalancing the economy is absolutely necessary. It is also a long-term project fraught with risks for China’s rulers – and for investors who have bought the story of inevitable western decline and unstoppable Chinese ascent.

　　要走出中國(guó)自己鉆入的死胡同沒(méi)有什么好辦法。經(jīng)濟(jì)再平衡是絕對(duì)必要的。對(duì)于中國(guó)統(tǒng)治者——以及那些認(rèn)為西方衰落將不可避免、而中國(guó)崛起亦無(wú)法阻擋的投資者而言，這也是一項(xiàng)充滿風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的長(zhǎng)期事業(yè)