中文摘要

　　本文的研究是以企業(yè)理論中的企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)為中心而展開的。企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)是指對(duì)企業(yè)總收入扣除所有的固定合約支付后的剩余額的要求權(quán)。本文首先將討論企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的界定與特征，然后分析其合約安排。本文的分析是以現(xiàn)代企業(yè)為基礎(chǔ)而進(jìn)行的?，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)安排合約主要包括兩個(gè)方面的內(nèi)容，其一是企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的分享安排，其二是企業(yè)的剩余計(jì)量規(guī)則及其制定權(quán)的安排。其中，對(duì)于第一方面，本文限于篇幅將著力于探討其分享的基本原則，亦即基于企業(yè)所有權(quán)安排合約基本框架來(lái)探討企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的意義。對(duì)于第二方面，企業(yè)剩余的計(jì)量規(guī)則及其制定權(quán)的安排問題，本文將提出一個(gè)關(guān)于企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量的悖論，而后從實(shí)踐和理論兩方面來(lái)解讀之。然后本文重點(diǎn)以上述理論研究為指導(dǎo)對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革中的企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)安排問題和1840-1997年中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排的變遷史及進(jìn)一步變遷的問題進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。上述這些研討內(nèi)容安排于五章中進(jìn)行，除第1章為“導(dǎo)論”外，其余四章分為上、下兩篇。上篇主要是對(duì)企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)安排進(jìn)行理論探討，包括第2、3章；而下篇?jiǎng)t是以上篇中的有關(guān)研究成果及理論為指導(dǎo)對(duì)中國(guó)的上述實(shí)踐問題進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，包括第4、5章。茲具體介紹如下。

　　第1章 本章系開篇之論，主要是提出本文所要研究的問題，指出本文的研究方法應(yīng)用和本文討論所賴以為基礎(chǔ)的幾個(gè)基本假設(shè)，并介紹本文的內(nèi)容章節(jié)安排。

　　第2章 本章系討論企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的界定、特征及意義。經(jīng)過(guò)討論，本文得出以下幾點(diǎn)關(guān)于企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的認(rèn)識(shí)：

　　1.企業(yè)剩余是指企業(yè)合約總收入扣除合約固定總支出后的剩余額，企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)就是對(duì)該剩余額的索取權(quán)（要求權(quán)）。企業(yè)剩余及其索取權(quán)可以有不同的形態(tài)，現(xiàn)代企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的常態(tài)是企業(yè)股東與經(jīng)營(yíng)者共享剩余。企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)具有狀態(tài)依存性的特征。企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)則是指在企業(yè)合約中未予明確的狀態(tài)出現(xiàn)時(shí)的相機(jī)處理權(quán)（決策權(quán)）。

　　2.企業(yè)的性質(zhì)在于其是一份市場(chǎng)里人力資本與非人力資本的特別合約，相對(duì)于市場(chǎng)合約而言，它是不完備的。企業(yè)合約的不完備性既承續(xù)了本文第一章中的思想，又是本章及以后各章討論的一個(gè)基點(diǎn)，它決定了企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)與企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)，即企業(yè)所有權(quán)的存在。

　　3.企業(yè)所有權(quán)安排的基本原則是企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)與剩余索取權(quán)的安排應(yīng)相對(duì)應(yīng)。這一基本原則體現(xiàn)于古典企業(yè)中，就表現(xiàn)為古典企業(yè)所有權(quán)安排合約的基本框架——企業(yè)股東（業(yè)主）獨(dú)享企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)與剩余索取權(quán)；體現(xiàn)于現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中，則表現(xiàn)為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)安排合約的基本框架——企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)安排給企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者享有，而企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)則安排給股東與經(jīng)營(yíng)者分享。企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)作為一種必要且有效的激勵(lì)工具的意義在企業(yè)所有權(quán)安排合約的基本框架中得以彰顯。

　　第3章 本章研究企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量規(guī)則及其制定權(quán)的合約安排問題，提出了“企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量悖論”，并從實(shí)踐和理論的角度成功地解讀了該悖論，具體而言：

　　1. 由于企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量規(guī)則存在較大的選擇空間，剩余計(jì)量會(huì)令企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的實(shí)際安排偏離其合約安排，故企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量及其規(guī)則制定權(quán)的合約安排是企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)安排合約的一個(gè)必要且重要的組成部分。但無(wú)論企業(yè)實(shí)踐，還是企業(yè)理論研究工作（實(shí)踐）均顯示出該合約安排不重要，故我們就此提出了“企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量悖論”。

　　2. 在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中，剩余計(jì)量工作是由會(huì)計(jì)來(lái)完成的。我們以交易成本為基本分析工具，并結(jié)合證券市場(chǎng)中的“逆向選擇”問題分析提出了企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則（包括剩余計(jì)量規(guī)則）制定權(quán)合約安排的范式，即政府享有一般通用會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則的制定權(quán)，企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者享有剩余的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)，而由注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師監(jiān)督企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者對(duì)一般通用會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則的遵循和剩余的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)的適當(dāng)行使，并通過(guò)英美兩國(guó)現(xiàn)代企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排的變遷來(lái)驗(yàn)證了該范式。在該范式中，一般通用的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則以會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的形式出現(xiàn)，它是一份公共合約，從企業(yè)私人合約中獨(dú)立出來(lái)了。從而，企業(yè)剩余索取安排合約、債務(wù)合約等私人合約中不必再就一般通用的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則作出規(guī)定，而并非會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則（含剩余計(jì)量規(guī)則）及其制度定權(quán)不重要。因此就在實(shí)踐意義上解讀了“企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量悖論”。

　　3. 我們研究了英美兩國(guó)的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排之變遷和會(huì)計(jì)信息的真實(shí)性等問題，得出了會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排的變遷是一種被動(dòng)式、誘致性和漸進(jìn)式變遷；意識(shí)形態(tài)在該變遷中發(fā)揮著重要作用；該變遷呈現(xiàn)“路徑依賴”特征；財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)中包含了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師進(jìn)行外部審計(jì)的安排；……等一系列重要結(jié)論和觀點(diǎn)。

　　4. 我們認(rèn)為，現(xiàn)行的企業(yè)理論是一種狹義企業(yè)理論，應(yīng)當(dāng)構(gòu)建一個(gè)包括會(huì)計(jì)理論在內(nèi)的廣義企業(yè)理論框架。在該廣義企業(yè)理論框架中，企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量悖論得以順利解讀。對(duì)企業(yè)剩余計(jì)量的理論研究并非不重要，而是很重要，專門有一批學(xué)者在研究之，并發(fā)展為“會(huì)計(jì)理論”。

　　第4章 本章主要以上篇中對(duì)企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的研究（尤其是基于企業(yè)所有權(quán)合約安排基本框架的企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)之意義分析）為指導(dǎo)，對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革中的企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)安排問題進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。本文通過(guò)有關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)分析指出：（1）中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者已享有相當(dāng)充分的企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)，但缺乏認(rèn)真行使之的有效激勵(lì)與約束；（2）中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者沒有分享企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)，且中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者對(duì)自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)地位很不滿意；（3）從而，依據(jù)企業(yè)所有權(quán)安排的基本框架與原則，中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的下一步改革重點(diǎn)之一就是要進(jìn)行國(guó)有企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)安排的改革，應(yīng)安排國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者參與企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的分享，其中包括以經(jīng)營(yíng)者的長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)?yōu)榛A(chǔ)的剩余索取權(quán)，即本企業(yè)的股票和（或）股票期權(quán)。

　　當(dāng)然，進(jìn)行國(guó)有企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的改革會(huì)遇到許多矛盾與困難，但我們應(yīng)持的態(tài)度是，堅(jiān)持改革開放，在改革中去解決問題，完善各類機(jī)制。需予以指出的是，企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)的分享并不是一帖“萬(wàn)能藥”，它只是國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及國(guó)有企業(yè)整體改革“藥方”中的一味“藥”而已，需與其他各味“藥”相配合才能產(chǎn)生效用，否則也許會(huì)弄得更糟。 其他各味“藥”既包括國(guó)有企業(yè)中宏觀層面的產(chǎn)權(quán)制度改革，也包括國(guó)有企業(yè)外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的變革（如形成充分競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的經(jīng)營(yíng)者市場(chǎng)、公司控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)等），以及國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的其他方面改革，如吸納外部董事，構(gòu)建強(qiáng)有力的董事會(huì)，加強(qiáng)監(jiān)事會(huì)的職能，加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部權(quán)力制衡機(jī)制的建設(shè)等。進(jìn)而言之，這其他各味“藥”的“藥方”可且應(yīng)一直開到包括中國(guó)社會(huì)、政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、法律各方面的體制改革與發(fā)展，如文中所提到的保護(hù)合法收入的法制（治）建設(shè)、會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排的變遷等等。

　　第5章 本章以上篇中對(duì)現(xiàn)代企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排范式與變遷的研究成果為指導(dǎo)對(duì)中國(guó)1840-1997年的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排的變遷進(jìn)行描述與分析。本文對(duì)此的研究是通過(guò)將之劃分為1840-1949年、1949-1980年、1981-1991年、1992-1997年這四個(gè)時(shí)段而分別加以描述與分析。通過(guò)描述與分析，我們認(rèn)為，1840-1997年中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排的變遷史就是該時(shí)段中國(guó)歷史的一幅縮影，與其環(huán)境特征具有高度的一致性，其變遷途中充滿了曲折與坎坷，只有在20世紀(jì)的最后兩個(gè)十年代里，中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)才真正迎來(lái)了發(fā)展的“盛世”。此期間中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)的變遷主要呈現(xiàn)出漸進(jìn)式變遷、被動(dòng)式變遷與誘致性變遷的特征，從1980年代開始的變遷中還呈現(xiàn)出強(qiáng)烈的路徑依賴特征以及供給主導(dǎo)型變遷與需求主導(dǎo)型變遷并存、交互影響的特征，并在一定程度上滯后于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制其他方面的變革，阻礙了中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。在本世紀(jì)余下的時(shí)間里和21世紀(jì)，在進(jìn)行包括企業(yè)剩余索取權(quán)安排在內(nèi)的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)等的變遷的同時(shí)，中國(guó)都必須始終如一著力于加強(qiáng)框架已初步形成的現(xiàn)代企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則制定權(quán)合約安排范式的構(gòu)建，盡快使之真正有效地運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)起來(lái)，變遷到位。

　　

　　“ Claim to Firm‘s Residue： Sharing Arrangement

　　and Residue Measurement“

　?。ˋbstract） 

　　This thesis is a cross-study based on economics （particularly， New Institution Economics and The Theory of the Firm） and accounting theory. In detail， the paper is on claim to firm‘s residue which can be defined as the difference between the total revenue and the total payment fixed by contracts entered into by a firm. Moreover， the paper bases its discussion on the modern enterprises which are characterized by the separation of ownership and control.

　　The contract for arranging claim to residue in modern enterprises， strictly speaking， is composed of two subcontracts. One subcontract is the contract for arranging the sharing of claim to residue （i.e.，residual claim）， the other is the contract for arranging the rights of determining rules concerning how to measure firm‘s residue. Both of the two subcontracts are important， the latter acts as a basis for the former in the sense that firm’s residue must be clearly measured before being shared by participants. For now， suffice it to say that residue measurement is one significant function of accounting.

　　As for the subcontract for arranging the sharing of claim to residue， we will mainly discuss the basic sharing principle due to limited coverage of the thesis. To put it another way， we will mainly explore the significance of claim to residue within the fundamental framework of the contract for arranging ownership of the firm. Of course， we will first outline the definition and characteristics of claim to residue. When it comes to the latter， we will suggest a paradox about the measurement of residue， and then explicate it in both practice and concept. After completing all of the above discussion， the thesis will make empirical research into the problem of how to arrange the sharing of claim to residue of State-Owned Enterprises （hereafter“SOEs”） in China， describe and analyze the historical change of contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules （embodying the residue measurement rules） in China （1840-1999） under the guidance of the above theoretical exploration.

　　All of the above content will be discussed in 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is the “Introduction”which suggests the problem that we are to discuss， points out the research method applied in the thesis， explains the basic assumptions and concepts on which the paper base its discussion ，and also introduces the arrangement of the content of the thesis. Other 4 chapters are classified into two parts： part 1，which includes Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 ， mainly explore claim to residue in concept； part 2，which is composed of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5，mainly empirically analyzes the above practical problems under the guidance of the theoretical exploration in part 1.Now，Let‘s outline the content of Chapter 2-5 in detail as following.

　　The definition， characteristics and significance of claim to residue are discussed in Chapter 2.Through detailed discussion， we draw several conclusions about claim to residue. First， claim to residue means as mentioned earlier at the beginning of the abstract. Second， Claim to residue is characterized by “state-contingency”， that is， people who will share claim to residue are contingent on the state of firms′ business operation. Third， what determines the existence of ownership of the firm， which includes claim to residue and residual rights of control as its two indispensable components， is the nature of the firm——an incomplete special contract of the human capital and non-human capital in the market. The last but not the least， claim to residue is an indispensable and effective instrument to give the joint entrepreneurs——shareholders and management ——the incentives to do best what they should do， this is the very significance of claim to residue. In other words， the significance of claim to residue arises from the basic arrangement principle or framework of ownership of the firm， which is to match claim to residue with residual rights of control as far as possibly. As the result， that management owns residual rights of control and shares claim to residue with shareholders is usual phenomenon in modern enterprises.

　　Chapter 3 explores the contractual arrangement of rights of determining residue measurement rules. As mentioned earlier， such contractual arrangement is an indispensable subcontract of the contract for arranging claim to residue， and is as important as the subcontract for arranging the sharing of claim to residue. However， not only business practice but also the research of the theory of the firm， seems to show us that such contractual arrangement is not important. Consequently， we raise the paradox entitled“Firm‘s Residue Measurement Paradox”。 In modern enterprises， the residue measurement function is enforced by accounting system as mentioned previously. Therefore， in order to explicate the paradox， we explore the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules using transaction cost as a basic analytical instrument， we also examine the “adverse selection” problem in securities market. Through the above discussion， we demonstrate that the paradigm of the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules in modern market economy system can be described as follows： the government owns the right of determining general accounting rules， and the management of enterprise shares the right of determining residual accounting rules， and the CPAs are responsible for supervising whether the management has practiced in accordance with the general accounting rules and has reasonably exercised the right of determining residual accounting rules. We verify the paradigm through examining the historical change of the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules in British and American cases. In the paradigm， the general accounting rules determined by the government is usually entitled “accounting standards”，which is a public contract in nature as the result of the institutional innovation which superseded original private contractual arrangement of single enterprise by public contractual arrangement in order to reduce transaction cost and then adapt to the development of modern enterprises. Consequently， it is not that contractual arrangement of determining accounting rules is not important but that such contractual arrangement has become public contract ，the private contracts such as contract for arranging claim to residue， and debt covenant， etc.， needn’t have the provisions about such contractual arrangement as a result .Accordingly， we successfully explicate the paradox in the practical sense. Then， by constructing a generated framework of the theory of the firm， which contains accounting theory， we successfully explicate the paradox from theoretical perspective. In other words， current framework of the theory of the firm is narrow ， in the generated framework constructed by us， the research of residue measurement is not lack of importance but very important， there are a lot of scholars who have specialized in it and develop it as “accounting theory”。

　　Empirical research of the arrangement of claim to residue of SOEs in China is made in Chapter 4. By analyzing the relative data， we draw the following conclusions：（1） the management of SOEs have owned considerably ample rights of residual control， however， there are not effective incentives and constraints to let them perform it seriously；（2） the management of SOEs haven‘t shared claim to residue for now， and they are dissatisfied with their economic state very much；（3） Consequently， according to the basic principle or framework of the contractual arrangement of ownership of the firm discussed previously ， one of SOEs’ reform measures which should be taken by the government is to reform the SOEs‘ current arrangement of claim to residue. To put it in detail， the management of SOEs should be permitted to participate in sharing claim to residue in order to match with the rights of residual control owned by the management. Note that such sharing includes the claim to residue based on the long-term operating performance of the management， such as stock option of the SOEs run by the management. Of course， in order to have satisfactory effect， the above reform measure should be co-operative with other reform measures such as the construction of the contractual arrangement of rights of determining accounting rules of the mentioned paradigm， etc.

　　Chapter 5 describes and analyses the change of contractual arrangement of determining accounting rules in China （1840-1997）。On the ground that when the contractual arrangement changes in essence， we classify the change of such contractual arrangement （1840-1997） into four periods：1840-1949，1949-1980，1981-1991，1992-1997.

　　Then ，we empirically examine the change of the contractual arrangement of each period and draw some empirical conclusions for each period. To mention such conclusions in detail is beyond the scope of this abstract， we would prefer to conclude them in summary. To summarize， the empirical evidence of the change history of the contractual arrangement in China （1840-1997） shows us as follows： （1） Such change is full of twists and turns except the change in the last two decades of 20th century. In effect， it is a true epitome of the whole change of Chinese history in such period. （2） The change is evolutionary， path-dependent， etc.， and is falling behind other reforms of economic system. （3） In China， contractual arrangement of determining accounting rules of modern enterprises in modern market economy system of the paradigm discussed earlier has been constructed preliminarily by now， such change helps to develop the socialist market economy. But effective measures should be taken to facilitate the change and to make the contractual arrangement of the paradigm more perfect and more adaptable to China′s environment.