BlackRock, the world's largest asset manager, says that when it comes to China, they're no panda bears.

　　全球最大的資產(chǎn)管理公司貝萊德(BlackRock)說(shuō)，它并沒有看空中國(guó)。

　　But while the firm isn't off fearfully gnawing on bamboo in the corner, they're not exactly, er, a panda bull either.

　　AP然而，盡管貝萊德談到中國(guó)時(shí)并非一副“熊”樣，但它也并非完全看多中國(guó)。

　　In a new research report titled “Can China's Savers Save the World?” eggheads from BlackRock's Investment Institute and Corporate Credit Group try to deconstruct the reality of risk in China.

　　貝萊德旗下投資研究所和企業(yè)信用集團(tuán)的研究員新近發(fā)布了一份題為《中國(guó)儲(chǔ)戶能否拯救世界？》(Can China’s Savers Save the World?)的研究報(bào)告，試圖解析中國(guó)所存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的真實(shí)情況。

　　The way they see it, there are “panda haters' and 'panda huggers.” Panda haters are the commentators who await China's demise. Panda huggers feel that government policy and liquidity will help avoid a Chinese economic apocalypse.

　　這些研究員認(rèn)為，目前存在“恨中國(guó)者”和“親中國(guó)者”兩類人。前者是等待中國(guó)崩潰的評(píng)論人士，后者則認(rèn)為中國(guó)的政府政策和金融流動(dòng)性將幫助中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)避免走向窮途末路。

　　The authors of BlackRock's note seem to fall somewhere in the middle. They believe that China runs the risk that there won't be sufficient funds to meet all of the investment demands of the country's economic actors, all in a battle for funding. “Financial system liquidity not solvency matters.”

　　貝萊德這份報(bào)告的作者們所持的觀點(diǎn)似乎介于上述二者之間。他們認(rèn)為中國(guó)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是，它沒有足夠資金來(lái)滿足該國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)參與者的全部投資要求，這些參與者目前都在拼命爭(zhēng)取資金。報(bào)告說(shuō)，重要的是金融系統(tǒng)的流動(dòng)性，而不是償付能力。

　　True, the authors contend, there is rapid growth in China, subsidized interest rates and opacity to China's banking system. Real-estate may be overblown and off-balance-sheet exposures are also on the rise. (Not to mention reverse Chinese mergers and SEC investigations blowing up in recent weeks.)

　　報(bào)告作者認(rèn)為，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)正在快速增長(zhǎng)，這是不爭(zhēng)的事實(shí)，但同時(shí)中國(guó)也存在利率補(bǔ)貼和銀行系統(tǒng)不透明的情況。中國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)可能已處于強(qiáng)弩之末，中國(guó)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表外的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)敞口也在不斷擴(kuò)大。（更不必說(shuō)最近幾周爆出的中國(guó)企業(yè)反向并購(gòu)和美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)(SEC)對(duì)此的調(diào)查等事。）

　　“While we are sympathetic to much of the logic behind these fears,' the authors write, 'We believe that these concerns float on some flimsy analysis.”

　　報(bào)告作者寫道：雖然我們對(duì)這些擔(dān)心中國(guó)的理由大多表示同情，但我們?nèi)匀徽J(rèn)為這種擔(dān)心所依據(jù)的一些分析不足為信。

　　The authors credit China's savers, not the Fed, for China's recovery since 2008. And they point to high domestic savings rates as a positive beacon going forward. With high savings and a current-account surplus, China lacks many of the vulnerabilities that toppled Western credit systems in 2008.

　　報(bào)告把2008年以來(lái)中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇歸功于中國(guó)儲(chǔ)戶，而不是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)。他們指出，中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的高儲(chǔ)蓄率是一個(gè)積極的燈塔，指引中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)向前發(fā)展。正是由于存在高儲(chǔ)蓄率和經(jīng)常賬戶盈余，中國(guó)才少了很多導(dǎo)致西方信用體系在2008年崩潰的漏洞。

　　BlackRock does harbor some concern that savings growth rates could stall in the next few years and bank deposits could lull. But they see more of a simmering down than a massive financial panic resulting. The firm expects a slowdown in trend growth over the next few years to 7-8% rather than the 8-10% level of recent years, they write.

　　貝萊德其實(shí)也有一些擔(dān)心，它認(rèn)為中國(guó)的儲(chǔ)蓄額可能會(huì)在未來(lái)幾年止步不前，銀行存款可能也會(huì)停止增長(zhǎng)。但報(bào)告作者認(rèn)為，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)更有可能逐步放緩，而不會(huì)出現(xiàn)那種可引發(fā)大規(guī)模金融恐慌的增長(zhǎng)放緩。他們寫道，貝萊德預(yù)計(jì)未來(lái)幾年中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的趨勢(shì)增長(zhǎng)率將為7%至8%，而不會(huì)像近幾年那樣保持在8%至10%的水平。

　　China worry warts or “panda bears” may also miss that much of the growth in China's balance sheet has been quasi-fiscal lending, which is backed by a system that's also seeing a rise in income with a relatively low level of debt, the authors write.

　　報(bào)告作者寫道，擔(dān)心中國(guó)前景的人或看空中國(guó)的人可能不了解，中國(guó)增加的大部分債務(wù)其實(shí)一直屬于準(zhǔn)財(cái)政貸款，這種貸款活動(dòng)受到某種體系的支持，在這一體系下，中國(guó)政府的收入也在增長(zhǎng)，債務(wù)水平相對(duì)較低。

　　Bad debt levels in China will eventually rise, the authors say. “China presents the classic picture of an over-expanding country,” they write. In a worst-case scenario, there could be as much as 7 trillion yuan of bad loans right now, they estimate.

　　報(bào)告作者說(shuō)，中國(guó)的壞賬水平最終將上升。他們寫道：中國(guó)是一個(gè)典型的擴(kuò)張過(guò)度的國(guó)家。據(jù)他們估計(jì)，若按最壞的情況估計(jì)，中國(guó)目前可能有至多人民幣7萬(wàn)億元的不良貸款。

　　“But balance sheets are strong, profit growth is subsidized by fixed lending and deposit rates, and economic growth itself should be strong enough to absorb most reasonable estimates of losses without serious challenges to financial system stability,” they write.

　　報(bào)告作者寫道：中國(guó)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表強(qiáng)勁，固定的存貸款利率補(bǔ)貼了利潤(rùn)的增長(zhǎng)，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的強(qiáng)勁程度，足以在不威脅金融體系穩(wěn)定性的前提下，將絕大多數(shù)合理范圍內(nèi)的貸款損失消化掉。

　　And in a very non-American fashion, China runs a large surplus, not reliant on foreign funding. China's current account will be more permeable as it moves to internationalize its currency, the authors say, but 'wholesale capital flight is unlikely' given the regulation of Chinese deposits.

　　跟美國(guó)很不同的一點(diǎn)是，中國(guó)的經(jīng)常賬戶有大量盈余，不用依靠外國(guó)資金。報(bào)告作者說(shuō)，隨著人民幣不斷國(guó)際化，中國(guó)經(jīng)常賬戶的滲透性將更強(qiáng)，但資本大規(guī)模流動(dòng)的可能性不大，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)對(duì)存款有著嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管。