The Chinese Communist party will celebrate its 90th anniversary on July 1 with a pride that testifies to the pragmatism it has shown since Deng Xiaoping determined to lift the nation out of poverty some 30 years ago, and set a course to make China what it is today. But the party also faces three huge challenges that should make us wonder what the country will be like when the centenary comes round.

　　中國共產(chǎn)黨將于7月1日迎來建黨90周年慶典，這件令其自豪的事情證明了該黨約30年來所奉行的務(wù)實政策的成功。大約30年前，鄧小平?jīng)Q心帶領(lǐng)中華民族擺脫貧困，并為中國開創(chuàng)了一條新路，引導(dǎo)中國發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化。但與此同時，中共也面臨三大挑戰(zhàn)。我們多半想知道，到中共建黨100周年的時候，這個國家將變成什么樣子。

　　First, China will this decade make the transition from a borderline to a fully fledged middle-income country, with per capita income rising more than three times to about $13,000. This will be a quite different experience from the trebling of per capita income that has occurred since Deng, because richer, more complex economies need high-quality institutions, especially in the legal arena, to sustain human development. This is far more important than national output, steel production or any other metric.

　　首先，未來10年，中國將實現(xiàn)從剛剛擺脫低收入國家身份到成為成熟中等收入國家的轉(zhuǎn)變，人均收入將增長兩倍以上，至1.3萬美元左右。這段經(jīng)歷將與鄧小平時代人均收入增長兩倍的經(jīng)歷截然不同，因為更富裕、更復(fù)雜的經(jīng)濟(jì)需要高質(zhì)量的制度（尤其是在法律領(lǐng)域），以維持人類發(fā)展。這種制度要比國民產(chǎn)出、鋼鐵產(chǎn)量或其它任何一種指標(biāo)重要得多。

　　In their absence, countries get stuck in a middle-income trap – as evidenced by Argentina, Venezuela and the former Soviet Union. The Fraser Institute ranks China’s institutional quality 82nd in a group of 141 countries. While it scores well in size and efficiency of government, it is weak in other areas, particularly regarding the rule of law and neutral legal institutions. The problem with reform in this area is that it clashes directly with the primacy of the CCP party over both the state and the judiciary.

　　如果建立不起這種制度，國家將落入“中等收入陷阱”——阿根廷、委內(nèi)瑞拉和前蘇聯(lián)的經(jīng)歷就證明了這一點。根據(jù)菲沙研究所(Fraser Institute)的排名，中國的制度質(zhì)量在141個國家中位列第82位。盡管它在政府規(guī)模與效率方面得分不錯，但在其它方面都表現(xiàn)欠佳，尤其是在法治和中立的法律機(jī)構(gòu)方面。中國制度改革的棘手之處在于，它與黨凌駕在政府和司法之上的現(xiàn)實發(fā)生了直接沖突。

　　Second, China is in the throes of a leadership change which, while carefully orchestrated, is exposing political and ideological struggles, not least for membership of the State Council. The revival of Maoism by some of the “princelings”, the revolutionaries’ children, is significant.

　　其次，中國正處在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層更迭的陣痛期。此次換屆安排得不可謂不精心，但仍暴露出不同派系在政治和意識形態(tài)上的角力——在對國務(wù)院位置（原文如此：譯者注）的爭奪上，這一點表現(xiàn)得尤其明顯。某些“太子黨”復(fù)興毛澤東思想的現(xiàn)象也值得注意。

　　Uncertainty is already apparent in foreign and domestic policies that sometimes reflect an assertiveness that derives from economic power, and sometimes a latent sense of insecurity that speaks to angst about both the party’s own legitimacy and rising social tensions. The escalation of the latter has resulted in a sharp crackdown on human rights activists and lawyers. Meanwhile, internal rivalries lie behind an intrusion of the military, state-owned enterprises and regional party elites into many areas of policymaking that is heightening political uncertainty.

　　在外交和國內(nèi)政策方面，不確定性已相當(dāng)明顯。這些政策有時反映的是一種源于經(jīng)濟(jì)實力的過分自信，有時反映的則是一種潛在的不安全感——即中共對自身合法性及社會緊張氣氛不斷加劇感到不安。這種不安情緒升級的結(jié)果就是對人權(quán)活動家和律師發(fā)動強(qiáng)力鎮(zhèn)壓。與此同時，內(nèi)部對抗也是軍隊、國企和地方黨委精英插手眾多政策制定領(lǐng)域、從而導(dǎo)致政治不確定性加劇的原因所在。

　　In the international security arena, a more truculent China has already emerged over the past two years. Posturing to Japan, South Korea and the US, complex relations with North Korea and Iran, and the courting of Pakistan – plus, to India’s chagrin, the construction of naval facilities – all have a sharper edge nowadays and point to tensions that detract from a crucial domestic agenda.

　　在國際安全領(lǐng)域，中國在過去兩年變得更加咄咄逼人。對日本、韓國和美國擺出架子，與朝鮮和伊朗關(guān)系復(fù)雜，巴基斯坦則在一旁大獻(xiàn)殷勤，還有就是在巴基斯坦建設(shè)海軍設(shè)施（此事令印度頗為惱火）。如今，這一切都變得更加尖銳，導(dǎo)致中國與有關(guān)國家關(guān)系緊張，干擾了其至關(guān)重要的國內(nèi)議程。

　　Third, China is at a crucial economic juncture. It has to attend to rising inflation in goods and property prices, rooted in the sharp rise in recourse to credit, sometimes of questionable quality, to finance high investment and growth. The political will to attack the underlying causes of inflation is weak, however, and there is no desire to use market mechanisms to set interest rates and the appropriate price of capital.

　　第三，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)正處在一個緊要關(guān)頭。它必須應(yīng)對不斷抬頭的商品和房地產(chǎn)價格通脹。通脹的根源在于，中國為確保高投資和高增長所需的資金，顯著加大了對信貸（信貸質(zhì)量有時存在問題）的依賴。但政府化解通脹根本原因的政治意愿很低，也不愿利用市場機(jī)制來設(shè)定利率和合適的資本價格。

　　China must also press on with rebalancing; that is, the move away from an investment-centric growth model to one based on consumption and services. This is a complex task, liable to lead to pronounced economic volatility – and it is also intensely political. It entails redistributing power from those who have benefited to date – companies, coastal regions, the military and provincial party elites – to those left behind, including consumers, migrant workers and the countryside, on which 780m citizens still depend for their livelihoods.

　　中國還必須加緊推進(jìn)再平衡過程，也就是說，擺脫以投資為中心的增長模式，轉(zhuǎn)到基于消費和服務(wù)的增長模式。這是一項復(fù)雜的任務(wù)——很可能導(dǎo)致明顯的經(jīng)濟(jì)波動——而且極具政治意義。它需要把現(xiàn)由既得利益者（企業(yè)、沿海地區(qū)、軍隊和省級黨政精英）掌控的權(quán)力重新分配給被落在后面的階層，包括消費者、農(nóng)民工和農(nóng)村地區(qū)——7.8億中國人仍依賴農(nóng)村維持生計。

　　In line with the Chinese proverb about crossing the river by feeling the stones, economic and financial policies change slowly. But, contrary to recent assuring statements from Wen Jiabao in this column, inflation is not yet beaten, and there is little evidence that successful rebalancing is occurring. If anything, investment is holding up too well, while households are compromised by rising inflation and financial repression. More than 40 per cent of household wealth is held as bank deposits, on which the real interest rate stands currently at -2.3 percent.

　　正如“摸著石頭過河”這句中國諺語所言，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融政策的改變是緩慢的。但是，與中國總理溫家寶最近為本專欄撰稿中那些撫慰人心的聲明正相反，中國的通脹并沒有被遏制住；而且鮮有證據(jù)顯示，中國正成功實現(xiàn)再平衡。相反，投資勢頭絲毫未減，老百姓則為日益抬頭的通脹以及金融壓制所累。中國逾40%的家庭財富都是銀行存款，而目前的實際存款利率為-2.3%。

　　Incremental change, however, will not substitute for institutional change and this is the CCP’s greatest challenge for the coming years. It has pulled China out of poverty with unprecedented speed and success by being smart and flexible. But in steering it to become a middle-income nation, it will need far more of the latter quality if, in aspiring to high-income status and global leadership, it is not to fall at what we might call a Bric wall.

　　但是，漸進(jìn)式改革無法取代制度改革，這一點將是中共未來幾年面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)。憑借聰明和靈活，中共帶領(lǐng)中國以前所未有的速度擺脫了貧困，取得了空前的成功。但在引領(lǐng)中國躋身中等收入國家的道路上，中共必須具備遠(yuǎn)勝以往的靈活性——前提是它志在讓中國成為高收入國家和全球領(lǐng)袖，而不是止步于一道由“金磚”(Bric)壘起的圍墻。