It probably comes as no surprise that Nouriel Roubini – also known as Dr Doom – is bearish on China and its current growth model. Based on “two trips” to China recently the good doctor has come up with a devastating prognosis.

　　“末日博士”魯里埃爾?魯比尼(Nouriel Roubini)對中國及其當(dāng)前的增長模式持悲觀看法或許沒什么可驚訝的。基于近期對中國的“兩次訪問”，這位神奇的博士給出了毀滅性的預(yù)測。

　　So is the man famous for predicting the downfall of the US housing market and subsequent global credit crisis about to notch up a second nostradamus award?

　　那么，這位以預(yù)測出美國住房市場崩盤及隨后的全球信貸危機(jī)而聞名的奇人，是不是會再捧回一個(gè)諾查丹瑪斯預(yù)言獎(jiǎng)呢？

　　Here’s a taste of his views on China, as first published on Project Syndicate:

　　讓我們感受一下他對中國的看法吧，該文最初發(fā)表在Project Syndicate上：

　　" China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure and property. To a visitor, this is evident in sleek but empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, thousands of colossal new central and provincial government buildings, ghost towns and brand-new aluminium smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging.”

　　“中國內(nèi)部到處充斥著在實(shí)物資本、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和不動產(chǎn)方面的過量投資。在一個(gè)訪問者眼中，證據(jù)就是那些光鮮靚麗卻旅客寥寥的機(jī)場和高速列車（這將減少45個(gè)計(jì)劃興建中的機(jī)場的客流量），通往偏僻之地的高速公路，數(shù)千座高大的中央與地方政府建筑，空無一人的新城區(qū)，以及被迫關(guān)閉以避免引發(fā)全球價(jià)格下跌的嶄新鋁冶煉廠。

　　" Eventually, most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing. All historical episodes of excessive investment – including East Asia in the 1990s – have ended with a financial crisis and/or a long period of slow growth.”

　　“中國大概會在2013年后遭遇一場硬著陸。事實(shí)上所有與過度投資有關(guān)的歷史場景——包括上世紀(jì)90年代的東亞地區(qū)所發(fā)生的一切——都會以一場金融危機(jī)和/或長期的低增長來謝幕。”

　　Mr Roubini is a brave soul to put a date on the great China collapse. Many have tried and failed miserably to do the same thing over the last two decades. He cleverly leaves the exact timing open and if you rephrased his comments they would actually say he thinks China will not suffer a hard landing in the next two years.

　　魯比尼竟然給偉大中國的崩盤確定了一個(gè)時(shí)間，真是膽大。過去20年間，有許多人做過類似的嘗試，但都遭遇慘敗。魯比尼很聰明，他并沒有限死具體時(shí)間，而且如果你對他的話進(jìn)行重新措辭，你會發(fā)現(xiàn)他實(shí)際上是在說自己認(rèn)為未來兩年中國不會遭遇硬著陸。

　　Some people counter his grim analysis by pointing out China has been over-building and over-investing for well over a decade and every time it looks like there is too much investment or infrastructure, growth catches up and spare capacity disappears. There are a lot of people in China after all.

　　有人對他的悲觀分析提出了反駁，指出中國的過度建設(shè)與過度投資已經(jīng)持續(xù)了十幾年，而且每當(dāng)投資與基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施似乎已經(jīng)超量時(shí)，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長又追趕了上來，消化了閑置產(chǎn)能。畢竟中國人口眾多。

　　Others might also argue that the poor quality of much of the construction also means that within a decade or two all the old infrastructure will have to be torn down and rebuilt.

　　另一些人或許還會指出，大部分建設(shè)項(xiàng)目的質(zhì)量很差，這意味著不到十年或二十年，老舊的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施就不得不被拆除，進(jìn)行重建。

　　But Mr Roubini may well be right and makes a convincing argument that China’s addiction to over-investment will eventually cause massive waste and much slower growth down the road.

　　但魯比尼很可能是正確的，他關(guān)于中國對過度投資的沉迷最終將造成巨大浪費(fèi)并導(dǎo)致未來經(jīng)濟(jì)增長大幅放緩的論述也相當(dāng)有說服力。

　　"No country can be productive enough to reinvest half of GDP in new capital stock without eventually facing immense overcapacity and a staggering non-performing loan problem.”

　　“任何國家都不可能擁有足夠的發(fā)展速度，足以在將50%的GDP重新投資的情況下最終避免遭遇巨大的產(chǎn)能過剩和令人憂心的不良貸款問題。”

　　"Continuing down the investment-led growth path will exacerbate the visible glut of capacity in manufacturing, property and infrastructure, and thus will intensify the coming economic slowdown once further fixed-investment growth becomes impossible. Until the change of political leadership in 2012-13, China’s policymakers may be able to maintain high growth rates, but at a very high foreseeable cost.”

　　“繼續(xù)沿著這條投資導(dǎo)向的道路走下去，將使已經(jīng)暴露出來的制造業(yè)、房地產(chǎn)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施產(chǎn)能飽和現(xiàn)象進(jìn)一步惡化，并在固定資產(chǎn)投資增長無法繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大的情況下加劇未來的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩。但直到2012-13年領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層換屆之前，中國的政策制定者們或許都能在繼續(xù)罔顧可以預(yù)見的巨額成本的情況下，維持一個(gè)高增長率。”

　　His assessment of the government’s latest five-year plan (2011-2015) is equally gloomy.

　　他對于中國政府十二五計(jì)劃的看法同樣悲觀。

　　He points out, correctly, that the latest five-year plan looks remarkably similar to the last one, with its rhetoric on rebalancing the economy and increasing the share of consumption in GDP, both goals where the government failed miserably.

　　他正確的指出，十二五計(jì)劃與上一個(gè)五年計(jì)劃驚人的相似，都宣稱要實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)平衡發(fā)展，提高消費(fèi)占GDP的比重，但這兩個(gè)目標(biāo)政府都未實(shí)現(xiàn)。

　　Mr Roubini is also right when he says the plan’s details reveal continued reliance on investment, especially public housing to boost growth.

　　魯比尼還說，計(jì)劃細(xì)節(jié)顯示出經(jīng)濟(jì)增長依然要仰仗投資（包括興建公共住房）來推動。這個(gè)看法也是正確的。

　　His prescription is a mix of reforms including: faster currency appreciation, substantial fiscal transfers to households, taxation and/or privatisation of state-owned enterprises, liberalisation of the household registration, or hukou, system, and an easing of financial repression.

　　他開出的藥方是一套綜合性改革措施，包括：實(shí)施更迅速的貨幣升值，面向家庭的大規(guī)模財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付，稅收和/或國有企業(yè)的私有化，解除戶口制度限制以及放寬財(cái)政管制。

　　The Mandarins in Beijing are certainly aware of and probably agree with many of the points Mr Roubini is making, but because of the difficulties in implementing any of these reforms they are unlikely to pay much attention to his advice.

　　北京的中央官員們顯然了解、而且或許也贊同魯比尼的許多觀點(diǎn)，但由于上述這些改革措施實(shí)施起來相當(dāng)困難，他們不太可能對他的建議給予太多關(guān)注。