Wen Jiabao paid an unusual visit to the city of Wenzhou during the recent national holiday. Accompanied by the head of the Peoples Bank of China, the finance minister and other senior officials, China’s premier went to assess the surge in informal lending to the city’s 450,000 small consumer product and export companies as well as property developers, many of which can no longer get cheap finance from state-owned banks and are failing. With property prices in the secondary market down 10 percent since June, Wenzhou’s problems shed light on China’s newest economic problem – a faltering property market.

　　國慶節(jié)期間，中國總理溫家寶對溫州進行了一次非同尋常的視察。在中國人民銀行行長、財政部長和其他高官的陪同下，溫家寶考察了當(dāng)?shù)?5萬家小型消費品和出口企業(yè)以及房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商民間貸款飆升的情況——許多企業(yè)無法再像過去那樣從國有銀行獲得廉價貸款，因此瀕臨破產(chǎn)。自今年6月以來溫州二手房價格已經(jīng)下降10%，因此其問題突顯出中國面臨的最新經(jīng)濟問題：房地產(chǎn)市場萎靡不振。

　　What happens if the 13 percent of GDP accounted for by property investment stalls or falls? Property is one of the main symbols and causes of urban wealth and is a key driver of industries including cement and steel. Property developers in China are faced with a fall in prices and transaction volumes, which in 20 big cities are about a third lower than a year ago. Depressed share prices are fueling fears that the property bubble is about to burst.

　　如果為國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)貢獻13%的房地產(chǎn)投資停滯或下降，將會出現(xiàn)什么情況？房產(chǎn)是城市居民財富的主要象征和來源之一，也是包括水泥和鋼材在內(nèi)多個行業(yè)發(fā)展的主要驅(qū)動因素。中國房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商面臨量價齊跌的局面——20個大城市的房地產(chǎn)交易量已同比下降三成左右。而低迷的房地產(chǎn)股票價格也使人們擔(dān)心房地產(chǎn)泡沫即將破裂。

　　The good news is that China managed a property slowdown successfully in 2004 without far-reaching macroeconomic consequences. And the bubble story assumes, often mistakenly, that local anecdotes of speculative activity and oversupply are national. It also ignores rising household incomes, urban house price-to-income ratios and rising demand for new and refurbished homes. A shake-out of weak developers and property assets, and some recapitalisation of banks are all manageable.

　　好消息是，2004年中國曾在沒有對宏觀經(jīng)濟造成嚴(yán)重影響的情況下成功地放緩了房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)的增長。認(rèn)為中國房地產(chǎn)存在泡沫的人經(jīng)常錯誤地認(rèn)定，房地產(chǎn)投機活動和過度供應(yīng)是一個全國現(xiàn)象。他們也忽視了中國家庭收入日益增長，城市房價收入比和人們對新房和改善性住房的需求日益上升等事實。實力較弱開發(fā)商的出局和房價的下跌，以及一些銀行的資本重組都在可控范圍之內(nèi)。

　　The bad news is that China has a big problem with leverage in local and provincial governments, which are responsible for infrastructure and land development. This has been likened locally to China’s sub-prime equivalent.

　　壞消息是，中國負責(zé)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和土地開發(fā)的地方和省級政府存在嚴(yán)重的杠桿貸款問題。這些貸款一直被比作中國的次貸。

　　Local governments have significant exposure to property values and collateral and are heavily-indebted with liabilities of at least 30 percent of GDP. Many are facing cash-flow problems and are prone to default, with large refinancings and repayments due in the next two years. Some Rmb3,000bn of bad local government loans, or 8 percent of GDP, are being scrutinised by regulators and the National Audit Bureau. A spate of failed land auctions, falls in land transactions and weakness in property prices could have far bigger consequences for China’s capitalist model.

　　中國地方政府在房地產(chǎn)價值和抵押品上擁有巨大敞口，背負的巨額債務(wù)至少占到GDP的30%。許多地方政府今后兩年需要進行大規(guī)模的再融資、償還大量債務(wù)，因此面臨現(xiàn)金流問題，很可能出現(xiàn)違約。監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和國家審計署正在審查地方政府約3萬億元人民幣（占GDP的8%）的壞賬。一系列土地流拍、土地交易量下降和房價下跌可能對中國的資本模式造成深遠得多的影響。

　　China has the classic symptoms of a typical investment bust, notably a steady deterioration in the quality of investment and financing. A rise in the investment share of GDP to 50 percent and signs of overcapacity in the construction and steel sectors should not be ignored. The rising ratio of the capital stock to output means that ever greater investment is needed to sustain GDP growth.

　　中國擁有典型投資崩盤的典型癥狀，突出表現(xiàn)在投資和融資質(zhì)量逐步下降。投資占GDP的比例已上升至50%，建筑和鋼材行業(yè)產(chǎn)能過剩，這些都是不容忽視的跡象。資本存量與產(chǎn)出的比率日益上升意味著，中國需要越來越多的投資來保持GDP的增長。

　　Beijing has to rebalance its investment-centric, credit-hungry economic model to one built round household consumption. But this is complex. It involves a redistribution of income from capital and profits to labour and wages; radical changes in the role of the exchange rate, interest rates and capital markets; and strategies to counter the high propensity to save by households, corporates and central government. It is also politically divisive because power and economic privilege have to be wrested from party elites, state enterprises and banks, and given to new beneficiaries such as private companies, households, college graduates and rural migrant workers, the last of which has become increasingly restive.

　　中國政府必須將其以投資為中心、高度依賴信貸的經(jīng)濟增長模式調(diào)整為以家庭消費為基礎(chǔ)的發(fā)展模式，但這是一件很復(fù)雜的事情。涉及到對資本收入和企業(yè)盈利進行二次分配，用來支付勞動力成本，提高工人薪資水平；徹底改變匯率、利率和資本市場扮演的角色；制定戰(zhàn)略，讓家庭、企業(yè)和央行改變喜歡儲蓄的傾向。它還會導(dǎo)致政治分化，因為政黨精英、國有企業(yè)和銀行的權(quán)力和經(jīng)濟特權(quán)必須被剝奪，讓私人企業(yè)、家庭、大學(xué)畢業(yè)生和農(nóng)民工等新群體受益。而農(nóng)民工已經(jīng)變得越來越難以管理。

　　Mr Wen continues to stress that the rebalancing of the country’s economy is of paramount importance to China, and to the global economy. We should wish China well in this endeavour. It needs to continue to put the credit and investment genies back in the bottle and pursue economic, legal and political reforms. Beijing’s forthcoming leadership transition does not make the timing propitious. The political will for swifter and more effective rebalancing is not convincing. Last week’s announcement of easier credit and tax policies for smaller companies will probably be followed by easier economic and credit policies and new investments this winter as weaker exports lead to slower growth. That might be good news for some, but not for rebalancing and economic stability.

　　溫家寶一直強調(diào)，中國經(jīng)濟再平衡對中國和全球經(jīng)濟來說極其重要。我們應(yīng)該希望中國在這方面有所作為。中國需要堅持努力，把信貸和投資沖動這兩個魔鬼塞回瓶子里去，并在經(jīng)濟、法律和政治領(lǐng)域開展改革。中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層即將換屆，因此目前并非很好的改革時機。加快推出更有效的經(jīng)濟再平衡措施的政治意愿并不強烈。上周中國政府宣布放松對小企業(yè)的信貸和稅收政策，而隨著出口下降導(dǎo)致增長放緩，今年冬天政府很可能會實施較寬松的經(jīng)濟和信貸政策，并進行新的投資。對某些人而言這可能是好消息，但對經(jīng)濟再平衡和穩(wěn)定而言卻并非如此。