The latest rise in China's inflation rate immediately spurred predictions of tighter credit by the People's Bank of China. Yet, higher rates might not have the kind of dampening impact they would elsewhere, in particular on the frothy property sector.

　　中國最新通脹率的升高，立即引發(fā)央行收緊信貸的猜測。但加息可能并不具備在其他國家那樣的抑制效應，特別是對于泡沫氣息濃重的房地產市場。

　　Shortly before China said Friday that its consumer price index rose a higher-than-expected 5.4% in March, Premier Wen Jiabao said food, labor and housing costs mean "we are still under great pressure." In carrying the premier's pledge to remain vigilant, the state-run Xinhua news agency termed home prices as "runaway."

　　EPA消費者在青島一次房地產交易會上觀看房屋模型。中國上周五發(fā)布數據顯示，3月份消費價格指數漲幅上升到5.4%，高于預期。之前不久，總理溫家寶說，從食品、勞動力和住房價格來看，“宏觀調控仍然面臨較大壓力”。官方媒體新華社在有關溫家寶承諾保持警惕的英文報道中，把房價描述為“runaway”，意思是如脫僵野馬。

　　Though a small component of the consumer price index, home prices are among the primary causes and risks of soaring inflation in China. Unaffordable housing is also a threat to social stability.

　　雖然房價只占消費價格指數中的小部分，但它是中國通脹加劇的主要原因和風險之一。買不起房的問題也對社會穩(wěn)定構成了威脅。

　　Economics theory dictates that higher rates would damp prices by signaling to prospective home buyers that they will face higher mortgage payments and should stick to the sidelines.

　　經濟理論認為，加息會向潛在買房人發(fā)出信號，讓他們知道自己將承擔更高的月供、所以應當持幣觀望，從而對房價起到抑制作用。

　　Now, a study quantifies how that's not the way it works in China, where tighter credit may actually spur higher prices.

　　但一篇論文用量化的方式說明，中國的情況不是這樣的，信貸收緊反而有可能刺激房價上漲。

　　Each credit-tightening move by the People's Bank of China between June 2005 and September 2010 has been accompanied by a 5% rise in annual home prices, according to a study published by the University of Nottingham's China Policy Institute. In other words, for every 0.5-percentage-point rate increase, property prices were 5% higher a year later.

　　諾丁漢大學(University of Nottingham)中國政策研究所(China Policy Institute)發(fā)表的一篇論文顯示，從2005年6月到2010年9月，中國央行每一次收緊信貸，都伴隨著房價同比上漲5%。也就是說，每加息0.5個百分點，一年后房價就上漲5%。

　　"Instead of running away from the market, investors rush to buy houses or shares whenever tightening monetary actions are taken," write the study's authors, professors Yao Shujie, Luo Dan and Loh Lixia.

　　 論文作者姚樹潔、羅丹和Loh Lixia寫道，每當貨幣政策收緊的時候，投資者非但沒有逃離市場，反而爭先恐后地購買房屋或股票。

　　Chinese real estate trends carry world-wide implications. 中國樓市的趨勢具有普世意義。

　　In a mid-March report, UBS economist Jonathan Anderson described Chinese property as "the single most important sector in the entire global economy," "pervading" the country's economy and driving factors like the price of copper.

　　 瑞士銀行(UBS)經濟學家安德森(Jonathan Anderson)3月中旬的一篇報告說，中國樓市是“整個全球經濟中最重要的市場”，無人能及，它“滲透”于整個中國經濟，推動著銅價等因素的變動。

　　A few days later, Wang Tao, a Beijing-based colleague of Mr. Anderson's at UBS, said in a separate report that risks are "very high" China could experience a property bubble in coming years. To gauge it, Ms. Wang said, "Most importantly, given the poor quality of the price-related data, we should watch closely construction activity and credit expansion."

　　沒過幾天，安德森在北京的瑞銀同事汪濤在另一篇報告中說，中國在未來幾年經歷樓市泡沫的風險“非常高”。汪濤說，考慮到價格相關數據質量不高，我們應當密切關注建筑活動和信貸擴張來判斷這種風險。

　　It’s well known that interest rates have a limited impact on China’s credit, primarily because the financial system lacks market mechanisms to ensure higher borrowing costs actually crimp credit growth. Indeed, China’s monetary policy itself isn’t solely an economic consideration.

　　 眾所周知，在中國利率對信貸影響有限。這主要是因為金融體系缺乏市場機制，無法確保借貸成本的增加能夠切實遏制信貸增長。事實上在中國，制定貨幣政策時經濟并非惟一的考慮因素。

　　These facts help explain why Beijing often backs up monetary policy changes with rhetoric, such as tough talk from Mr. Wen.

　　這就解釋了為什么貨幣政策變動時，中國政府常常用各種表態(tài)以示支持，比如總理溫家寶的強硬言論。

　　“The message from the central government is very clear. The government is trying to control speculation and investor demand,” J.P. Morgan’s China Chairman Jing Ulrich told the Australian Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai this week.

　　摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）中國證券和大宗商品主席李晶（Jing Ulrich）上周在上海告訴澳洲商會（Australian Chamber of Commerce），中央政府傳遞的信息非常清楚，即設法控制投機和投資者需求。

　　But, like the Nottingham study notes, Ms. Ulrich highlighted how housing prices have risen even as bank credit has tightened. At 20%, the prevailing “reserve ratio” means big banks need to park 20 cents of every dollar they have on deposit, she said. That represents a significant choke on their scope to lend─but still home prices soar.

　　但是和諾丁漢大學的研究報告類似，李晶也強調了在銀行信貸緊縮的同時，住房價格卻在增長。李晶說當前的存款準備金率為20%，這意味著大型銀行每一美元的儲蓄就要在央行存入20美分。這極大抑制了銀行的信貸能力，但住房價格仍然高漲。

　　Central parts of Beijing’s plan to control housing prices, she noted, aren’t rate-related: taxes, targets, plus plans to build 36 million “affordable” apartments in the just-adopted five-year plan.

　　李晶指出，中央政府控制房價計劃的核心部分與利率無關：剛剛通過的“十二五”規(guī)劃提出了房產稅改革和房價增速低于GDP增速的目標，并計劃新建3,600萬套保障房。

　　The authors of the Nottingham paper use the word “irrational” 11 times in 34 pages to describe how the investment psychology of Chinese citizens frustrates the workings of monetary policy.

　　前述諾丁漢大學的論文作者在34頁的文章中11次用到“非理性”來描述中國居民的投資心理是如何令貨幣政策的運作受挫的。

　　Yet, the paper also explains roots of the behavior: “Rapid urbanization, attitude towards home ownership, lack of investment channel and imperfect market competition are some of the key factors responsible for large stock market and housing bubbles,” it says.

　　但這篇論文也解釋了這種行為的根源：城市化進程加快；對安居置業(yè)的傳統(tǒng)態(tài)度；缺乏投資渠道；市場競爭并不完善。這些都是吹大股市和樓市泡沫的主要因素。

　　“Apart from acting early and more aggressively, the Chinese government should try to create more investment channels, to promote a fairer and better free-market system, to shift its economic structure, which will depend less on investment and more on effective domestic consumption,” it says.

　　論文說，除了盡早開始積極行動，中國政府應該盡量拓寬投資渠道，推動建設一個更加公平合理的自由市場體系，轉變經濟結構，減少對投資的依賴，促進國內有效消費需求。

　　China’s monetary policy mechanisms might be imperfect, but they are needed to tackle the problem.

　　中國的貨幣政策機制可能并不完善，但要解決房價問題，貨幣政策必不可少。