China has aroused international alarm by using its virtual monopoly of rare earths as a trade instrument and by stalling multilateral efforts to resolve disputes in the South China Sea. Among its neighbours, there is deep concern at the way it is seeking to make water a political weapon.

　　中國將其對稀土資源的實質(zhì)性壟斷當成一種貿(mào)易手段，并阻止旨在解決南中國海爭端的多邊努力，這已引起了國際社會的警覺。而中國謀求把水資源作為一種政治武器的做法，令其鄰國深感憂慮。

　　At the hub of Asia, China is the source of cross-border river flows to the largest number of countries in the world – from Russia to India, Kazakhstan to the Indochina peninsula. This results from its absorption of the ethnic minority homelands that make up 60 per cent of its land mass and are the origin of all the important international rivers flowing out of Chinese territory.

　　中國地處亞洲中心位置，發(fā)源自中國境內(nèi)發(fā)源的跨境河流所流向的國家數(shù)量堪稱全球之最——從俄羅斯到印度，從哈薩克斯坦到印度支那半島。這是源于中國對少數(shù)民族居住地的吸納——這些少數(shù)民族居住地區(qū)占到了中國陸地總面積的60%，是從中國流出的所有重要國際河流的發(fā)源地。

　　Getting this pre-eminent riparian power to accept water-sharing arrangements or other co-operative institutional mechanisms has proved unsuccessful so far in any basin. Instead, the construction of upstream dams on international rivers such as the Mekong, Brahmaputra or Amur shows China is increasingly bent on unilateral actions, impervious to the concerns of downstream nations.

　　事實證明，迄今為止在任何流域，旨在使這個著名水資源大國接受資源共享協(xié)議或其它合作機制的努力都未獲成功。相反，在湄公河、雅魯藏布江或黑龍江等國際河流上游建造的大壩表明，中國越來越傾向于采取單邊行動，全然無視下游國家的擔憂。

　　China already boasts both the world’s biggest dam (Three Gorges) and a greater total number of dams than the rest of the world combined. It has shifted its focus from internal to international rivers, and graduated from building large dams to building mega-dams. Among its newest dams on the Mekong is the 4,200 megawatt Xiaowan – taller than Paris’s Eiffel Tower. New dams approved for construction include one on the Brahmaputra at Metog (or Motuo in Chinese) that is to be twice the size of the 18,300MW Three Gorges – and sited almost on the disputed border with India.

　　中國不僅號稱擁有世界上最大的水壩（三峽大壩），而且其水壩總數(shù)超過了全球其它國家的總和。中國已將重點從國內(nèi)河流轉(zhuǎn)向國際河流，并從建造大型水壩升級為巨型水壩。中國在湄公河流域建造的最新一座大壩，是4200兆瓦的小灣水電站——比巴黎的埃菲爾鐵塔還要高。中國獲準建造的新水壩包括雅魯藏布江上的Metog（中文名為“墨脫”）水電站。該電站裝機規(guī)模將是三峽大壩（1.83萬兆瓦）的兩倍，所處位置緊鄰與印度存在爭議的邊境地區(qū)。

　　The consequences of such frenetic construction are already clear. First, China is in water disputes with almost all its neighbours, from Russia and India to weak client-states such as North Korea and Burma. Second, its new focus on water mega-projects in the homelands of ethnic minorities has triggered tensions over displacement and submergence at a time when the Tibetan plateau, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have all been wracked by protests against Chinese rule. Third, the projects threaten to replicate in international rivers the degradation haunting China’s internal rivers.

　　這種大壩建造狂潮的后果已十分明顯。首先，中國與幾乎所有鄰國——從俄羅斯和印度，到朝鮮和緬甸等“附庸國”——都發(fā)生了圍繞水資源的爭議。其次，在青藏高原、新疆和內(nèi)蒙古都爆發(fā)了反對中國統(tǒng)治的抗議活動之際，中國最近對少數(shù)民族居住地區(qū)大型水電項目的關(guān)注，引發(fā)了圍繞移民和土地被淹問題的緊張情緒。第三，這些項目有可能使得中國內(nèi)陸河流出現(xiàn)的退化問題，在那些國際性河流身上再現(xiàn)。

　　Yet, as if to declare itself the world’s unrivalled hydro-hegemon, China is also the largest dam builder overseas. From Pakistan-held Kashmir to Burma’s troubled Kachin and Shan states, China is building dams in disputed or insurgency-torn areas, despite local backlash. Dam building in Burma has contributed to renewed fighting, ending a 17-year ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army and government.

　　然而，似乎是為了宣稱自己是全球無與倫比的水電巨擘，中國也是在海外建設(shè)水壩數(shù)量最多的國家。中國正不顧當?shù)孛癖姷牡钟|，在有爭議地區(qū)或叛亂地區(qū)——從巴基斯坦控制的克什米爾，到緬甸動蕩不安的克欽和墠邦——建造水壩。在緬甸建設(shè)水壩，是導(dǎo)致該地區(qū)重燃戰(zhàn)火，終結(jié)了克欽獨立軍(Kachin Independence Army)與政府之間長達17年的停戰(zhàn)狀態(tài)的原因之一。

　　For downriver countries, a key concern is China’s opacity on its dam projects. It usually begins work quietly, almost furtively, then presents a project as unalterable and as holding flood-control benefits.

　　對下游國家而言，一個關(guān)鍵的擔憂是中國大壩項目的不透明性。中國通常悄然（幾乎是偷偷摸摸地）開工，隨后則表示項目已無法更改，同時可以帶來抵御洪水的好處。

　　Worse, although there are water treaties among states in south and south-east Asia, Beijing rejects the concept of a water-sharing arrangement. It is one of only three countries that voted against the 1997 UN convention laying down rules on the shared resources of international watercourses.

　　更糟糕的是，盡管南亞及東南亞各國都簽署了水資源協(xié)議，但中國政府拒絕接受水資源共享安排。中國是投票反對1997年聯(lián)合國建立國際流域共享資源公約僅有的三個國家之一。

　　Yet water is fast becoming a cause of competition and discord between countries in Asia, where per capita freshwater availability is less than half the global average. The growing water stress threatens Asia’s rapid economic growth and carries risks for investors potentially as damaging as non-performing loans, real estate bubbles and political corruption.

　　然而，水資源正迅速成為亞洲各國之間爭奪和沖突的根源。亞洲人均淡水可獲得量不足全球平均水平的一半。日益增長的水資源壓力，威脅到了亞洲快速的經(jīng)濟增長，同時給投資者帶來了與不良貸款、地產(chǎn)泡沫和政治腐敗同樣具有破壞力的風險。

　　By having its hand on Asia’s water tap, China is therefore acquiring tremendous leverage over its neighbours’ behaviour.

　　由于控制著亞洲的“水龍頭”，中國對其鄰國的行為有著巨大的影響力。

　　That the country controlling the headwaters of major Asian rivers is also a rising superpower, with a muscular confidence increasingly on open display, only compounds the need for international pressure on Beijing to halt its appropriation of shared waters and accept some form of institutionalised co-operation.

　　控制著亞洲主要河流上游的中國，也是一個正在崛起的超級大國，越來越對公開展示自己有著強烈的自信心，而這只會加大國際社會向中國政府施壓的必要性，要求其停止“侵占”共享河流，并接受某種形式的合作機制。