Say it ain't so, Warren !

　　沃倫，快告訴我們這不是事實(shí)！

　　Investors were shocked to learn this week that David Sokol, a trusted lieutenant to Berkshire Hathaway Chairman Warren Buffett, had bought nearly $10 million worth of stock in Lubrizol just over a week before he suggested to Mr. Buffett that Berkshire should acquire the company.

　　上周，投資者得知了一個(gè)令人震驚的消息，伯克希爾哈撒韋董事長沃倫•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)非常信任的愛將大衛(wèi)•索科爾(David Sokol)在建議巴菲特收購Lubrizol的一個(gè)多星期以前，買進(jìn)了這家化學(xué)品公司價(jià)值近1000萬美元的股票。

　　Leave aside the obvious point that Mr. Sokol might not have lived up to Berkshire's high ethical standards. Focus instead on this: If even Mr. Buffett can fail to appreciate a potential conflict of interest under his very nose, then ordinary investors need to realize just how pervasive and insidious conflicts are throughout the financial world.

　　Christophe Vorlet撇開索科爾可能達(dá)不到伯克希爾的崇高道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)這個(gè)顯而易見的事實(shí)不談。讓我們關(guān)注這一點(diǎn)：如果就連巴菲特都未能覺察到發(fā)生在他眼皮底下的一個(gè)潛在的利益沖突，那么普通的投資者就必須認(rèn)識(shí)到：整個(gè)金融界該充斥著多少陰險(xiǎn)狡詐的利益沖突啊。

　　In the past few weeks alone, a chemist at the Food and Drug Administration was charged with trading on confidential information about drug approvals; a former Goldman Sachs Group director has been accused of leaking secrets to hedge-fund manager Raj Rajaratnam; and Mr. Rajaratnam has gone on trial for allegedly masterminding an insider-trading ring. The director and the hedge-fund manager maintain their innocence; the chemist hasn't yet been arraigned.

　　僅在過去幾周的時(shí)間內(nèi)，這樣的事情就屢屢發(fā)生。美國食品和藥物管理局(Food and Drug Administration，簡稱FDA)的一位藥劑師被控利用職務(wù)之便提前獲知保密的藥品審批信息后買賣相關(guān)公司的股票以非法牟利；高盛集團(tuán)(Goldman Sachs Group)的一位前任董事被控向?qū)_基金經(jīng)理拉杰•拉賈拉特南(Raj Rajaratnam)泄露機(jī)密；而拉賈拉特南已經(jīng)因涉嫌策劃一個(gè)內(nèi)部交易圈而受審。高盛的這位前董事和這位基金經(jīng)理都堅(jiān)稱自己無罪；那位藥劑師尚未被傳訊。

　　But how could Mr. Buffett, universally regarded as a beacon of integrity, have let Mr. Sokol's unusual trading occur unchecked?

　　但是，被人們普遍視為誠信標(biāo)桿的巴菲特怎么能允許索科爾的這種反常交易不受控制地發(fā)生呢？

　　Although Mr. Sokol resigned on March 28, both he and Mr. Buffett have insisted that he did nothing unlawful; Mr. Sokol has stressed that his resignation had nothing to do with his Lubrizol trades.

　　盡管索科爾已經(jīng)在3月28日辭職，但他和巴菲特都堅(jiān)稱，他沒有從事任何非法活動(dòng)；索科爾強(qiáng)調(diào)，他的辭職與他買賣Lubrizol股票的交易沒有任何關(guān)系。

　　"Dave's purchases were made before he had discussed Lubrizol with me and with no knowledge of how I might react to his idea," Mr. Buffett said in a news release on Wednesday. " Furthermore, he knew he would have no voice in Berkshire's decision once he suggested the idea."

　　 巴菲特在4月6日發(fā)布的新聞稿中稱，“大衛(wèi)在跟我討論Lubrizol之前已經(jīng)購買了該公司股票，他并不知道我會(huì)對(duì)他的建議做出什么反應(yīng)。并且他知道盡管他提出了這個(gè)建議，但他在伯克希爾并沒有決定權(quán)。”

　　Mr. Buffett said in the news release: " In our first talk about Lubrizol, Dave mentioned that he owned stock in the company. It was a passing remark and I did not ask him about the date of his purchase or the extent of his holdings."

　　巴菲特在這份新聞稿中稱，“在我們首次談?wù)揕ubrizol時(shí)，大衛(wèi)就提到他持有這家公司的股票。當(dāng)時(shí)我們只是隨便說說，我沒有追問索科爾購買這些股票的時(shí)間以及他的持有量有多大。”

　　Mr. Buffett told me on Friday that 'everything in [the news release] is accurate." All he would add is that 'I don't know of anything even remotely material that was omitted from the release."

　　巴菲特在4月1日告訴本文作者，新聞稿中的每一句話都是準(zhǔn)確的。他所要補(bǔ)充的只有這一句，“我沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)這份新聞稿遺漏了任何有一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)重要的事情。”

　　Mr. Sokol's trading falls under what Stephen Bainbridge, an expert on securities at the UCLA School of Law, calls "an enormously gray area of the law." It also is a reminder that a basic principle of securities law—disclosure cures conflicts—is nonsense.

　　索科爾的交易行為被加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校法學(xué)院(UCLA School of Law)的證券法專家斯蒂芬•斑布里奇(Stephen Bainbridge)歸入法律的一個(gè)巨大灰色地帶。它還提醒人們，證券法的一個(gè)基本準(zhǔn)則——信息披露可以防止利益沖突——是沒什么實(shí)效的。

　　" Even assuming that [Mr. Sokol] did nothing illegal, [his action] is typical of the kinds of conflicts of interest permitted by our financial system that undermine the integrity of markets," says Max Bazerman, an ethicist at Harvard Business School and co-author of the new book " Blind Spots."

　　新書《盲點(diǎn)》(Blind Spots)的合作者之一、哈佛商學(xué)院(Harvard Business School)倫理學(xué)家麥克斯•巴澤曼(Max Bazerman)稱，即使假設(shè)索科爾沒有做違法的事，他的行為也引發(fā)了一種典型的利益沖突，雖然這種利益沖突為我們的金融體系所允許，但是會(huì)削弱市場的誠信度。

　　Most people have what Mr. Bazerman calls an ethical blind spot. Faced with a potential conflict of interest, you automatically conclude that it couldn't possibly offer any temptation to someone of superior character—like you or those closest to you.

　　 大多數(shù)人都有巴澤曼所稱的道德盲點(diǎn)。當(dāng)面臨一個(gè)潛在的利益沖突時(shí)，你會(huì)自動(dòng)得出結(jié)論：這不可能對(duì)品格卓越的人（比如說你或你身邊最親近的人）構(gòu)成任何誘惑。

　　One study among doctors, for example, found that 53% felt it was ethical to accept a high-paying consultancy from a pharmaceutical firm. Only 36% felt it might skew their judgments about which medications to prescribe. Yet 62% felt that other doctors' decisions might be tainted by the same arrangement.

　　例如，在醫(yī)生中進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查顯示，有53%的受訪者覺得接受一家制藥公司的高薪顧問工作是合乎道德的行為。只有36%的受訪者感覺這種行為可能會(huì)改變他們?cè)陂_藥時(shí)做出的判斷。然而，有62%的人認(rèn)為，同樣的這種行為發(fā)生在其他醫(yī)生身上可能會(huì)影響他們的判斷力。

　　Likewise, a survey of nearly 1,000 Wall Street analysts found that two-thirds have accepted favors from the companies they follow—everything from career advice to reference letters for admissions into private clubs. Analysts who accept such favors generally deny that their integrity has been compromised—yet are twice as likely to maintain their rating after an earnings shortfall by a company that provided them with favors.

　　 同樣地，對(duì)近1000位華爾街分析師進(jìn)行的調(diào)查顯示，三分之二的受訪者曾經(jīng)接受過他們所追蹤的公司提供的好處——從職業(yè)建議到加入私人俱樂部的介紹信，什么都有。接受過這種好處的分析師普遍否認(rèn)他們的誠信度打了折扣，然而，如果曾給他們提供好處的某家公司的收益未達(dá)到預(yù)期水平，他們維持其評(píng)級(jí)不變的可能性是一般情況下的兩倍。

　　Or think of student-loan officers steering borrowers to lenders that secretly offered kickbacks or junkets; credit-rating agencies being paid by the firms they rate; financial advisers accepting trinkets like tote bags and T-shirts from fund companies; auditors examining the books of companies to whom their firms provide consulting services; mutual-fund traders who used to accept gifts from brokers like casino outings and stays at ski resorts. All have maintained that they aren't conflicted.

　　再看看其他行業(yè)吧：負(fù)責(zé)學(xué)生貸款的官員把借款人引薦給偷偷提供回扣或宴請(qǐng)他們的貸款企業(yè)；財(cái)務(wù)顧問接受基金公司贈(zèng)送的手提包和T恤衫；審計(jì)師為接受他們事務(wù)所咨詢服務(wù)的公司審查帳目；共同基金交易員過去常常接受經(jīng)紀(jì)商的禮物——比如去娛樂場或滑雪勝地游玩。這些人都堅(jiān)稱他們沒有面臨利益沖突。

　　In testimony to Congress in 1991, Mr. Buffett said he expected all his employees " to ask themselves whether they are willing to have any contemplated act appear the next day on the front page of their local paper, to be read by their spouses, children and friends, with the reporting done by an informed and critical reporter. If they follow this test, they need not fear my other message to them: Lose money for the firm and I will be understanding; lose a shred of reputation for the firm and I will be ruthless."

　　根據(jù)一位消息靈通、言辭犀利的記者所撰寫的報(bào)導(dǎo)，巴菲特1991年向美國國會(huì)作證時(shí)稱，他希望自己所有的員工在打算有所行動(dòng)前都捫心自問，是否愿意看到這件事出現(xiàn)在第二天本地報(bào)紙的頭版上，讓他們的配偶、孩子和朋友一覽無余。如果他們通過了這項(xiàng)考驗(yàn)，就無需害怕他給出的另一條警訊：讓公司虧錢，他可以理解；如果給公司的名譽(yù)帶來絲毫損失，他將會(huì)毫不留情。