Playing the Oil Card
打石油牌
1. Washington and Tehran don't agree on much these days. But in their conflict over Iran's nuclear program, both seem willing to use oil as a political weapon.
1、華盛頓與德黑蘭如今在許多方面自說自話，但在它們之間有關(guān)伊朗核計(jì)劃的沖突中，雙方似乎都愿意把石油當(dāng)政治武器使用。
2. The U.S. believes that sanctions on Iran's energy exports might force Tehran to renounce its uranium-enrichment ambitions. Iran hopes its threats to withhold some or all of those exports will persuade the international community to back off.
2、美國(guó)認(rèn)為，對(duì)伊朗的能源出口進(jìn)行制裁或可迫使德黑蘭放棄其鈾濃縮的野心；伊朗則希望以威脅停止部分或全部石油出口來迫使國(guó)際社會(huì)作出讓步。
3. If the two sides can't agree on who would be punishing whom by playing the oil card, the likelihood of diplomatic resolution may be even more remote than is commonly accepted.
3、如果雙方不能在打石油牌到底是誰懲罰誰方面達(dá)成一致，外交解決的可能性會(huì)比一般所認(rèn)可的更加渺茫。
4. One thing is certain: a substantial reduction in Iran's energy output would have a significant impact on global oil prices. Iran is the fourth-largest oil exporter in the world, behind only Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Norway. It sells more than 2.5 Million barrels a day and is believed to have about 10 percent of the world's proven reserves. Many analysts say a supply cut could combine with other market pressures to quickly drive prices up to $80 to $100 a barrel.
4、有一件事是確定無疑的：伊朗能源輸出大量減少將對(duì)全球油價(jià)產(chǎn)：生重大的影響。伊朗是世界上僅次于沙特阿拉伯、俄羅斯和挪威的第四大石油出口國(guó)。它每天出售250多萬桶石油，據(jù)信約擁有世界已探明石油儲(chǔ)量的10%.許多分析人士認(rèn)為，石油供給的減少可能與其它市場(chǎng)壓力因素一起迅速驅(qū)動(dòng)油價(jià)升至每桶80至100美元。
5. Is either side bluffing? Iran's threat to pull oil off the market is not an empty one, Iran's leaders—who want to visibly assert their defiance of the West, need domestic support for the regime, and divide international opinion—have only the country's energy exports with which to influence the outcome of the diplomatic conflict.
5、雙方都在虛張聲勢(shì)地嚇唬人?伊朗威脅斷絕石油的市場(chǎng)供應(yīng)并非虛言恫嚇，伊朗領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人—他們要鮮明地堅(jiān)持他們對(duì)西方的蔑視，需要閩內(nèi)對(duì)政府的支持并分化國(guó)際輿論—只有國(guó)家的能源出口可資利用，去影響外交沖突的結(jié)果。
6. Of course, were Iran to completely cut off its oil supply, it would badly damage its own economy. In addition, a total shutdown would harm many of Iran's friends, though it would also increase oil income for those who are net exporters of oil （such as Russia and other OPEC members）.
6、當(dāng)然，如果伊朗完全切斷其石油供應(yīng)，將嚴(yán)重地破壞其自身經(jīng)濟(jì)。此外，完全停止石油出口會(huì)傷害許多伊朗的朋友，盡管這樣做也會(huì)增加那些石油凈出口國(guó)的收入（譬如俄羅斯和其他歐佩克成員國(guó)）。
7. But there are a number of incremental steps Iran can take that would rattle those who depend on affordable energy without sinking its own economy. If Iran cut 200,000 to 300,3000 barrels a day, oil markets would react not only to the fall in supply but also to fears of what Tehran might do next.
7、但伊朗可以采取許多漸進(jìn)的步驟，讓那些依賴價(jià)格可承受能源的國(guó)家惶惶不安，而保持自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)不至直線下滑。如果伊朗每天削減20萬至30萬桶石油出口，石油市場(chǎng)不僅會(huì)對(duì)供給下降有反應(yīng)，而且還會(huì)對(duì)因擔(dān)心德黑蘭下一步可能做什么有反應(yīng)。
8. The U.S. isn't bluffing either. Although Iran is a net exporter of oil, it is a net importer of refined products. Washington calculates that if it could cut off the supply of those products, including gasoline, Iran would be unable to build new refineries quickly enough to keep pace with growth in the country's demand, estimated at more than 5 percent a year. And a boycott of Iranian exports, it figures, would hurt Iran more than it would hurt the U.S.
8．美國(guó)亦非虛聲恫嚇。盡管伊朗是個(gè)石油凈出口國(guó)，但它也是精煉石油產(chǎn)品的凈進(jìn)口國(guó)。華盛頓推測(cè)，如果它切斷包括汽油在內(nèi)的那些精煉石油產(chǎn)品的供應(yīng)，伊朗沒有能力足夠迅速地建造新的煉廠，以滿足預(yù)計(jì)每年高于5%的國(guó)內(nèi)需求增長(zhǎng)。抵制伊朗石油出口對(duì)伊朗的傷害比對(duì)美國(guó)的傷害更大。
9. Iran is unlikely to use its oil weapon first. But if the U.S. were to impose punitive measures—either through the United Nations Security Council or with a smaller coalition of nations——Iran would probably retaliate. And if a limited supply cut failed to ease international pressure, Iran could up the ante by cutting off supplies to a U.S ally. One possible target: resource-poor Japan, which imports 16 percent of its crude from Iran.
9．伊朗不大可能率先使用其石油武器。但如果美國(guó)強(qiáng)行施加懲罰性措施一一無論是通過聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)還是通過規(guī)模小一些的國(guó)家聯(lián)盟—伊朗很可能進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)。進(jìn)而，如果有限的石油供應(yīng)減少不能緩解國(guó)際壓力，伊朗可能提葉賭注，切斷對(duì)美國(guó)的某個(gè)盟友的石油供應(yīng)。一個(gè)可能的目標(biāo)是資源匱乏的日本。日本16%的原油從伊朗進(jìn)口。
10. Then there is Iran's trump card. If Tehran believes that a U.S. or Israeli air strike against one of its nuclear facilities is likely, it might well stage military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf to remind the world that it can obstruct the flow of 20 percent of the planet's oil supply at the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. Such a threat was recently made by Interior Minister Mostafa Pourmohammade and, it followed through, could interrupt the global supply chain and trigger a sharp and immediate spike in oil prices.
10．另外，伊朗手中握有王牌。如果德黑蘭認(rèn)為，美國(guó)或以色列可能空襲其某一核設(shè)施，伊朗很可能在波斯灣舉行軍事演習(xí)，讓世界明白它能在極具戰(zhàn)略意義的霍爾木茲海峽阻斷全球20%的石油供應(yīng)。內(nèi)政部長(zhǎng)穆斯塔法·保爾·穆罕默德最近就發(fā)出了這樣的威脅。如果真這么做，可能打斷全球石油供應(yīng)鏈，并引發(fā)油價(jià)驟然劇烈地上漲。
11. Some analysts argue that it is less dangerous for Washington to simply accept a nuclear Iran than to risk the damage that sharp Iranian production cuts—or Iranian retaliation against a U.S. or Israeli military strike—might do to U.S. interests.
11．一些分析家認(rèn)為，對(duì)華盛頓來說，較之冒伊朗石油急劇減產(chǎn)、伊朗對(duì)美國(guó)或以色列的軍事打擊進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)的危險(xiǎn)對(duì)美國(guó)利益可能造成的破壞，索性接·乏一個(gè)核伊朗危險(xiǎn)要小一些。
12. But the Bush administration fears that Iran might use its nuclear program to assert political dominance in the region and sell nuclear material and expertise to other states, and possibly to terrorist groups.
12．但布什政府擔(dān)心，伊朗可能利用其核項(xiàng)目在該地區(qū)確保政治上的主導(dǎo)地位，向其他國(guó)家出售核材料及技術(shù)，而且可能出售給恐怖主義組織。
13. The U.S. will continue over the next several months to try to push sanctions through the Security Council. But the council is increasingly unlikely to impose them.
13．在未來的幾個(gè)月里，美國(guó)將繼續(xù)試圖使安理會(huì)通過制裁決議。但安理會(huì)越來越不大可能實(shí)施制裁。
14. If the Bush administration decides it cannot use the UN process to compel Iran to back down, it will probably look for other levers of political and economic coercion, including attempts to recruit a "coalition of the willing" that is prepared to temporarily cut energy and other commercial ties with Tehran. The success of such a coalition strategy would depend on the number of countries willing to join.
14．如果布什政府判定，它不能利用聯(lián)合國(guó)程序迫使伊朗放棄鈾濃縮計(jì)劃它可能會(huì)尋求其他政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)的高壓手段，包括努力招募一個(gè)“自愿聯(lián)盟”，準(zhǔn)備暫時(shí)中斷與德黑蘭的能源及其他商業(yè)關(guān)系。這樣一種聯(lián)盟戰(zhàn)略的成功與否取決于自愿加入國(guó)家的數(shù)量。
15. Iran and the U.S. have agreed to face-to-face talks on the situation in Iraq. Although Iran says its nuclear program will not be on the agenda, the U.S. is sure to broach the subject and to search for any slack in Tehran's bargaining position.
15．伊朗和美國(guó)已經(jīng)同意就伊拉克境內(nèi)局勢(shì)進(jìn)行面對(duì)面的對(duì)話。盡管伊朗稱《核計(jì)劃將不列入對(duì)話議程，但美國(guó)必定要提出這個(gè)話題，并從德黑蘭討價(jià)還價(jià)立場(chǎng)中尋找任何有懈可擊的環(huán)節(jié)。
16. It is unlikely to find any. Iran's willingness to talk has more to do with efforts to convince a domestic audience that it has become the go-to power on regional issues and to show that U.S. attempts to stabilize Iraq aren't going well.
16．美國(guó)不大可能找到任何有懈可擊的環(huán)節(jié)。伊朗愿意對(duì)話，更多地是因?yàn)樗霕O力讓國(guó)內(nèi)民眾相信，在地區(qū)問題上它已變成可以依靠的強(qiáng)國(guó)，并想讓世人明白美國(guó)穩(wěn)定伊拉克局勢(shì)的努力進(jìn)展不暢。
17. When the nuclear subject is raised, the two sides are likely to reiterate their mutually exclusive positions, raising the danger that the meeting could end up hardening mutual mistrust. Though they agree that oil makes for an effective weapon, Tehran and Washington don't see eye to eye on anything else. And that's bad news for those who hope to head off substantial upward pressure on oil prices.
17、當(dāng)核話題提出后，雙方很可能重申他們相互排斥的立場(chǎng)，從而引發(fā)這樣的危險(xiǎn)：會(huì)談可能以加深相互猜疑而告終。盡管他們一致認(rèn)為，石油可以充當(dāng)有效的武器，但在其他任何議題上，德黑蘭與華盛頓的看法均不一致。這對(duì)那些希望擺脫油價(jià)大幅上漲壓力的國(guó)家來說，委實(shí)是壞消息。
